The outcome of the lawsuit filed last week by Gavin Brown will be determined by how a judge defines “county seat.”

Brown, along with town attorney Mike Bonfoey, believes the county seat is the corporate limits of Waynesville. County attorney Chip Killian and others think county commissioners can designate any area within the county as the “county seat,” and that Waynesville is not legally defined as the county seat by state statute.

“I’ve gone back and read the 1810 legislation when the county separated from Buncombe and done a ton of research into the history of this thing, and I believe we are on strong legal footing,” said Killian of the county’s position.

Brown’s lawsuit claims that building the justice center in Ratcliffe Cove would constitute an illegal “relocation of the county seat.”

Brown admits that there is no legal definition of county seat in the state’s general statutes. However, he cites at least 11 instances in the statutes where a county seat is referenced as the place where court is held and other offices are located. By his reasoning, these references “assume” that a particular town is the county seat. He claims that the county can’t meet the “necessary functions required for the courts and other governmental activities” if it builds a new justice center outside the town limits of Waynesville.

The county, however, is backed up in its belief by a written summary from the state Institute of Government in Chapel Hill. As long ago as Aug. 29, 2001, assistant county manager Rick Honeycutt received a letter from James Drennan of the IOG which said “the term ‘county seat’ refers to the place in a county where the courthouse and other facilities are located, and not a particular town or city.”

Drennan relies on a progression of changes in state statutes. He relies heavily on GS 153A-169, which grants counties the authority by resolution or ordinance to redesignate the location of the county courthouse. That statute replaced one which required a special act of the legislature to move a courthouse more than one mile from its current location.

In his suit, Brown cites, among others, GS 7A-42, which is titled “Sessions of superior court in cities other than county seats.”

That law specifically allows three counties to hold Superior Court outside their county seats, “assuming” that county seats are in a designated city.

The ruling in the suit will likely lay the foundation for a more definitive definition of “county seat.”

“I’m here to seek an answer to the question, legally, of what ‘the county seat means,” said Brown.