The North Carolina Clean Smokestacks Bill (SB 10780), after passing
the Senate 43-5, is pending in the state House Public Utilities Committee
due to opposition by some industries to the cost recovery provisions
of the legislation. This bill is an attempt to dramatically reduce nitrogen
oxide, sulfur dioxide and mercury emissions from 14 grandfathered coal
burning power plants owned by utility companies in North Carolina. Emissions
from similar plants outside our state borders are responsible for about
half the air pollution in our state and have an even more dramatic effect
in the western mountains where rates of asthma, chronic bronchitis,
emphysema and other pulmonary diseases have been skyrocketing.
The main purpose of SB 1078, therefore, is to set an example for other
states to follow in regulating coal burning power plants. It would give
us legal and moral standing to demand that our neighbors stop polluting
our air.
But with SB 1078 stuck in committee and the legislative session winding
down, a compromise has been floated in an attempt to move the bill.
Its no secret that members of the health and environmental community
have been uneasy with the current compromise on the Clean Smokestacks
Bill being proposed by the governors office and key members of
the state legislature. Even groups who have resigned themselves to lending
public support to the compromise acknowledge that further gains will
have to be won in the future to experience significant health benefits.
Until now there have been mainly two controversial issues in the re-worked
bill. The first is the weakening of the nitrogen oxide (NOx) standard.
The original bill caps NOx emissions at 56,000 tons annually, or a 78-percent
reduction from 1998 levels. The compromise caps NOx emissions at 70,000,
a 72-percent reduction. This is significant because the generally accepted
scientific threshold for having a meaningful impact on ground-level
ozone production is an 80-percent reduction in NOx in this geographical
region. The 72-percent proposal falls far short of this goal.
The second issue is the division of the bill into two phases for the
reduction of sulfur dioxide (SOx). The implementation of the second
phase would be subject to the discretion of the Secretary of the Department
of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR). Although the ultimate goal in
the bill is a 73-percent reduction of SOx, its doubtful this would
ever be achieved. DENR has been notorious for favoring industrial interests
over public opinion on air quality issues. The utility industry will
undoubtedly oppose the second phase of SOx reductions. This means the
compromise effectively cuts out one-third of the SOx reductions in the
original bill passed by the Senate.
Now, it turns out, we may be compromising much more than was first believed.
New language has been added to the compromise legislation that singles
out the annual NOx emission cap, mandating these reductions be actual
emission reductions. This is referring to the practice of trading pollution
credits, allowed by federal regulations in lieu of actual
reductions. According to federal policy, if a power plant in California
is meeting or exceeding federal pollution standards, it can sell pollution
credits to a plant in North Carolina that is not meeting pollution standards.
This enables the North Carolina utilities to meet federal regulations
and continue to operate its power plants without actually cleaning them
up.
By singling out the annual NOx emission cap for actual reductions,
the compromise specifically and intentionally omits the same requirements
for summertime ozone season NOx which comes under the federal code in
the state Implementation Plan.
In other words, during the worst period of the year for smog, the Clean
Smokestacks Act would permit trading of NOx pollution credits in lieu
of actual reductions.
Furthermore, there is no similar mandate for actual reductions
of SOx written into the bill. This leaves open for interpretation wheth-er
utilities could trade SOx pollution credits in lieu of actual
reductions. Specific methods of achieving SOx reductions are not mentioned
in the legislation. The only guideline is that reductions must be achieved
in compliance with federal code. Trading is one method of achieving
SOx reductions in compliance with federal code. If this ambiguity is
included in the final compromise, there is no substantive gain here.
This is a hollow piece of legislation.
One more thing worth mentioning about the compromise is that it doesnt
address the problem that prevented the bill from moving forward in the
House in the first place. The issue was never the emission reductions.
At all the hearings held by the Public Utilities Committee, all parties
involved — industries, health and environmental groups and legislators
agreed that the standards in the original bill were valid. The only
issue was cost recovery. Who should pay for this?
Polls showed residential consumers were willing to pay their share in
exchange for clean air. But, high energy consuming industry objected
to the fact that utilities were able to pass on the entire cost to consumers.
This is the issue that was never tackled. This is where the governor
and legislators have failed. Rather than showing leadership by standing
up to industry and forcing a compromise on cost recovery, the lungs
of our children are being compromised — if we let it happen.
Because of these considerations, the Canary Coalition, the only regional
grassroots organization devoted solely to air quality issues, will not
line up to give its stamp of approval to the compromise being proposed.
This compromise sets a poor example for other states to follow and undermines
North Carolina's ability to compel cleanups elsewhere in the region.
The Canary Coalition remains committed to building public support for
the original Clean Smokestacks Bill that passed in the Senate overwhelmingly
last April. North Carolinians should demand of their leaders no less
than actual leadership.
(Friedman is executive director of the Canary Coalition.)